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Abstract
The trend towards extensible software architectures and
component-based software development demands safe, efﬁ-
cient, and easy-to-use extension mechanisms to enforce pro-
tection boundaries among software modules residing in the
same address space. This paper describes the design, im-
plementation, and evaluation of a novel intra-address space
protection mechanism called Palladium, which exploits the
segmentation and paging hardware in the Intel X86 archi-
tecture and efﬁciently supports safe kernel-level and user-
level extensions in a way that is largely transparent to pro-
grammers and existing programming tools. Based on the
considerations on ease of extension programming and sys-
tems implementation complexity, Palladium uses different
approaches to support user-level and kernel-level extension
mechanisms. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the Palla-
dium architecture, we built a Web server that exploits the
user-level extension mechanism to invoke CGI scripts as lo-
cal function calls in a safe way, and we constructed a com-
piled network packet ﬁlter that exploits the kernel-level ex-
tension mechanism to run packet-ﬁltering binaries safely in-
side the kernel at native speed. The current Palladium pro-
totype implementation demonstrates that a protected proce-
dure call and return costs 142 CPU cycles on a Pentium
200MHz machine running Linux.
1 Introduction
Two emerging trends in applications software development
call for operating systems support for establishing protec-
tion boundaries among program modules that execute in
the same address space. First, the notion of dynamic ex-
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tensibility has prevailed in almost every major category
of software systems, including extensible database systems
[26], to which third-party data blades can be added to per-
form type-speciﬁcdata processing,extensible operatingsys-
tems [6, 15, 23], which supportapplication-speciﬁcresource
managementpolicies, programmableactive network devices
[1, 27] that allow protocol code running on network de-
vices to be tailored to individual applications, and user-level
applications that dynamically integrate third-party modules
to augment the applications’ core functionalities such as
Adobe’s Premiere [12] and Apache Web Server [2]. A dis-
tinct feature of extensible software systems is supportof live
addition and removal of software modules into and from a
running program. Because the host program and the exten-
sion software modules share the same address space, an ef-
fective and efﬁcient mechanism to protect the core of the
running host program from dynamically inserted extension
modules is crucial to the long-term viability of extensible
software architecture. Second, component-based software
development(CBSD) [18] is emergingas the dominantsoft-
ware development methodology because it signiﬁcantly im-
provessoftware productivityby encouragingmodularityand
re-usability. As software components produced by multi-
ple vendors are used to construct complete applications, a
properlevel of protectionamong software componentsis es-
sential to address the key challenge of the CBSD method-
ology: prevention of interference among independently de-
veloped componentsand the resulting loss of system robust-
ness. Appropriate inter-component isolation makes it is eas-
ier to quarantine buggy components and pinpoint the cause
of application malfunctioning.
Although a number of approaches have been proposed
to provide intra-address space protection, such as software
fault isolation [29], type-safe languages[6], interpretive lan-
guages [17], and proof-carrying code [19], none satisﬁes
all the design goals of an ideal intra-address space pro-
tection mechanism: safety from corrupting extension mod-
ules, low run-time overhead, and programming simplicity.
The commonality among all the above approaches is the
use of software-only techniques to create protection do-
mains within an address space. The implicit assumption of
these approaches is that hardware-based protection mech-
140anisms are only applicable to inter address-space protec-
tion. In contrast, this paper describes an intra address-space
protection mechanism called Palladium, which is based on
the segment-level and page-level protection hardware in the
Intel X86 architecture. Palladium is efﬁcient, guarantees
the same level of safety as using separate address spaces,
and requires only modest efforts in the deployment and de-
velopment of software extensions. Although the proposed
mechanism is geared towards the Intel X86 architecture, the
fact that this architecture dominates more than 90% of the
world’s desktop computer market implies that it can have
wide applicability and thus see practical uses.
The basic idea of Palladium to protect an extensible ap-
plication from its extensions is to put the core program and
its extensions in disjoint segments that belong to the same
address space but are at different protection levels. Because
software extensions are put at a less privileged protection
level than the core program, they cannot access the core pro-
gram’s address space without proper authorization. This ap-
proach is possible because the Intel X86 architecture sup-
ports variable-lengthsegments and multiple segment protec-
tion levels. Unfortunately, this approach signiﬁcantly com-
plicates the interfaces between extensible applications and
their extensions because cross-segment references require
changes to the underlying pointers and thus put additional
burdens on application programmers and/or compiler writ-
ers. While the requirementof changing inter-segment point-
ers is acceptable for kernel extensions, it is considered too
drastic for user-level extensions. As a result, we developed
a separate protection mechanism that exploits the page-level
and segment-level protection hardware features of X86 ar-
chitecture to support user-level extensions without requiring
pointer modiﬁcations. This second mechanism signiﬁcantly
improves the transparency of extensions programmingcom-
pared to the segment-only approach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 reviews previous works on supporting intra-address space
protection. Section 3 details the virtual memory support
from the Intel X86 architecture. In Section 4, we describe
Palladium’s protection and protected control transfer mech-
anisms to support kernel and user-level extensions. Section
5 presents a comprehensiveperformancestudy of Palladium
based on measurements from a user-level extensible appli-
cation for fast CGI script invocation, and a kernel-level ex-
tensible application for packet ﬁltering. Section 6 concludes
this paper with a summary of main results and an outline of
the on-going work.
2 Related work
Previous approaches to fast communications between pro-
tectiondomainsattemptto eitherestablish protectionbound-
aries within an address space or reduce the IPC overhead
between address spaces. Most of them focused mainly on
kernel-level extensions but not on user-level extensions. In
this section, we review important ideas from these efforts
and conclude with a comparison between them and Palla-
dium.
2.1 Providing protection within an address
space
Multics [4, 11] pioneered the use of segmentation and ring-
like protection hardware, which is available in GE-645 ma-
chines, in virtual memory architecture. Segments are visi-
ble to application programmers and are used to host code,
stack, data, and even ﬁles and directories. Data sharing
within a process or among processes is controlled through
segment-level protection checks. Unlike the X86 architec-
ture, the paging hardware in GE-645 does not support page-
level protection. Paging in GE-645 is mainly for perfor-
mance optimization rather than for protection. Palladium’s
kernel-level extension mechanism is similar to Multics, but
its user-level extension mechanism is quite different. Palla-
dium exploits both page-level and segment-level protection
checks to hide segmentation from application programmers
and existing programming tools.
HP’s PA-RISC architecture [21] provides the most com-
prehensive protection and security hardware support among
modernRISC machines. Like X86, PA-RISC has4 privilege
levels. Similar to segments, PA-RISC supports the notion of
multiple protection identiﬁers per process. A page with a
given access identiﬁer is only accessible to a process with
the matching protection identiﬁer. By associating different
sets of protection identiﬁers with different code modules in
the same process, PA-RISC can support multiple protection
domains within a single address space. However, except a
briefmentionin Brevix[30], nogeneralOS extensionmech-
anisms built on top of this architectural feature have been
reported in the literature. Opal, which is a single-address-
space OS [7], also used a similar protection-domain identi-
ﬁer idea to enforce protection boundaries within an address
space.
One software-only approach to provide intra-address
space protection is to interpret rather than execute an exten-
sion. Protection can be guaranteed only if the interpreter
itself is correct. An example of this approach is Java-based
systems, where the language itself is type-safe and does not
allow arbitrary pointer accesses [10], and run-time interpre-
tation of Java programs can perform additional checks to
detect bugs such as those that cause denial of service [8].
For example, the HotJava Browser can be extended with ap-
plets written in Java [24]. Another example is the Berkeley
Packet Filter, in which the kernel interprets ﬁltering rules
submitted by the applications [17]. There are two problems
with the interpretation approach. First, the safety/security
offered by this approach is only as strong as the interpreter
implementation. For example, there have been a number of
security-related bugs discovered in Java virtual machine im-
plementations. The problem is that software systems remain
difﬁcult to verify. The second problem is that Java appli-
cations are still less efﬁcient than their C counterparts, ei-
ther because of run-time interpretation [24] or because of
additional type checking and garbage collection cost when a
just-in-time compiler is used.
In software fault isolation (SFI), an extension is sand-
boxed so that any memory accesses it makes are guaranteed
to fall within the memory region allocated to the extension
[29, 25]. Additional instructions are inserted to the exten-
141sion’s binaries to force memory accesses to fall into the ex-
tension’s allocated region. The protection offered to appli-
cations can be write protection (only writes made by the ex-
tension are forced), or read-write protection (all memory ac-
cesses are forced). VINO [23] is an extensible kernel that
uses SFI. The overhead imposed by SFI ranges from under
1% to 220% of the execution time of an unprotected exten-
sion running in the same address space.
Anotherway to protectan extensibleapplicationfromits
extensions is to write the extensions in a type-safe language,
such as Modula-3. Because of the language restrictions, the
extension cannot access the application memory and corrupt
the core program. This is the approach taken by SPIN [6].
The SPIN OS kernel itself is written in Modula-3, and it is
possible to extend the kernel at the granularity of individual
functions by dynamically linking code written in Modula-3
into the kernel. Protection is ensured by both compile-time
and run-time checking performed by the language compiler
and run-time system. The difference between this approach
and SFI is that the application depends on the Modula-3
compiler to generate code for run-time checking. A buggy
compiler can actually allow extension code to corrupt the
application, and at least once, such an incident has occurred
[24]. The overhead percentage of this approach depends on
the typesofoperationsthatextensionsperform,andhasbeen
found to range from 10% to 150% of the same code written
in C.
The protected shared libraries project [3] attempted to
build sensitive systems services as user-level libraries, rather
than into the kernel. The implementation on AIX 3.2.5 still
required context switching for protection-domain crossing,
and thus sufferedfrom a much higher performanceoverhead
compared to Palladium.
2.2 Reducing IPC overhead
Lightweight RPC (LRPC) [5] reduces the overhead associ-
ated with making an RPC call to a server process execut-
ing in the local machine by optimizing data copying and
network-related processing operations. In LRPC, a server
module registers itself with the kernel and exports a set of
procedures to the kernel by creating a Procedure Descriptor
List. Each ProcedureDescriptor in the list will have an asso-
ciated argument stack. The client and server share the argu-
ment stack when a procedure in the server is invoked. This
eliminates copying data multiple times. Since the client, the
kernel, and the server have foreknowledge that the partic-
ular RPC call is to a server running on the local machine,
argument marshaling overhead can be eliminated and sim-
ple byte copying can be used. Further, the server and client
stubs are directly invokedby the kernel with a simple upcall.
The result is that LRPC performsup to fourtimes faster than
conventional RPC. On a C-VAX Fireﬂy machine, LRPC re-
quires 125
￿secs for a Null function call to complete, com-
pared to 464
￿secs for a more conventional RPC call. Note
that two context switches and four protection domain cross-
ings must still be performed by the LRPC mechanism for a
request-reply transaction.
The L4 micro-kernel [16] achieved extremely fast IPC
performance by sharing page tables between multiple pro-
cesses. On the Intel Pentium Processor, the kernel ensures
that processes are protected from each other by reloading
the segment registers on a context switch. Thus a page table
switch and the associated TLB ﬂush is avoided when pos-
sible. In an L4 micro-kernel running on an Intel Pentium
166MHz Processor, an IPC request-reply requires a mini-
mumof242cycles, or1.46
￿secs intheidealcase. However,
four protection domain crossings are needed for a request-
replytransaction. Moreover,if the sum of the virtual address
spaces covered by the segments of active processes exceeds
the 4-GByte virtual address space available in the proces-
sor, the kernel either has to prevent further processes being
spawned or incurs the overhead of a page table switch. Ex-
plicit data copying is still inevitable in L4 for processes to
share data. Anothersingle-address-spaceOS, Mungi [13], is
built on L4’s fast IPC to support sparse capabilities and fast
protected procedure calls on MIPS-R4600 64-bit micropro-
cessor.
2.3 Comparison
Software-only approaches to support intra-address space
protection that are based on SFI, interpretation, or type-safe
languages requiring dynamic typing checks, incur an over-
head that is approximatelyproportionalto the amount of ex-
tensioncodeexecuted. Inaddition,the protectionguarantees
provided by software-only approaches is only correct if the
implementationofthe compiler,the interpreter,or the binary
patching tool is bug-free. Past experiences indicate that this
need not always be the case.
Hardware-based protection mechanisms do not incur
per-instruction overhead beyond the processor-level perfor-
mance cost. The cost of invoking an extension is typically a
one-time cost associated with each protection-domaincross-
ing. Hardware design is also more likely to be tested exten-
sively or veriﬁed formally, and thus is less buggy compared
to software at the same level of product maturity. In addi-
tion, hardware-based approaches do not require substantial
changes to existing programmingpractices, and thus greatly
simplify extension programming. It is not necessary for de-
velopers to learn new programming languages or to drasti-
cally change current programming styles to compose safe
extension modules. Until now, very few extension mech-
anisms have exploited segmentation hardware support [16]
to support multiple protection domains within an address
space, especially at both the user and kernel levels. To the
best of our knowledge, Palladium is one of the ﬁrst, if not
the ﬁrst such successful attempts.
3 Protection hardware features in Intel X86
architecture
3.1 Protection checks
Intel X86 architecture’s virtual memory hardware supports
both variable-length segments and ﬁxed-sized pages, as
shown in Figure 1. A virtual address consists of a 16-bit
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Figure 1. The virtual memory architecture of Intel X86 architecture, which provides both segment-level and page-
level protection checks, and supports variable-length segments as well as a 4-level protection ring. For each
memory access, the hardware performs checks for segment limit violation, segment-level and page-level protection
violation, and read/write permission. To speed up the translation and protection check process, modern X86-based
processors include a Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB), which is automatically ﬂushed on task switch.
segmentselector,whichisinoneoftheon-chipsegmentreg-
isters, and a 32-bit offset. which is given by EIP register for
instruction references, ESP register for stack operations, or
other registers/operands in the case of data references. The
segment selector is an index into the Global Descriptor Ta-
ble (GDT) or the current process’s Local Descriptor Table
(LDT). The choice between GDT and LDT is determined
by a TI bit in the segment selector. The GDT or LDT entry
indexed by the segment selector contains a segment descrip-
tor, which, among other things, includes the start and limit
addresses of the segment, the segment’s descriptor privilege
level (DPL), and R/W read/write protection bits. The 32-bit
offset is added to the given segment’s start address to form a
32-bitlinear address. The most signiﬁcant20 bits of a linear
address are a virtual memory page number and are used to
index into a two-level page table to identify the correspond-
ing physical page’s base address, to which the remaining 12
bits are added to form the ﬁnal physical address. The page
size is 4 KBytes.
Each segment can be in one of four possible segment
privilege levels (SPL), which is speciﬁed in the DPL ﬁeld
of the segment’s descriptor. Each virtual page can be in one
of two possible page privilege levels (PPL). SPL 0 is the
most privileged level and SPL 3 is the least privileged level.
Similarly, PPL 0 is more privileged than PPL 1. By default,
pages that belong to segments at SPL between 0 to 2 are
mapped to PPL 0 while pages that belong to segments at
SPL 3 are mapped to PPL 1. Therefore, code segments at
SPL 3 do not have the privilege to access pages at PPL 0.
The segment privilege level of the currently executing code
is stored in the last two bits of the Code Segment register.
Intel X86 architectureprovidesprotectionchecksat both
segment and page levels. After a linear address is formed,
the hardware checks whether it is within the corresponding
segment’s limit as speciﬁed in the segment descriptor. Pro-
gram execution based on code residing at a less privileged
level, i.e., with a higher SPL, cannot access data segments
or jump to code segments that are at a more privileged level,
i.e., with a lower SPL. At the page level, the protectionhard-
wareensuresthatprogramsexecutingatSPL3cannotaccess
a page marked as PPL 0 and programs executing at SPL 0
to 2 can access all pages. With segmentation checks, each
segment can form an independent protection domain if seg-
ments are disjoint from one another.
CPU control registers that are related to protection, in-
cluding the base address registers for LDT and GDT, and
the registers that point to the starting address of the current
process’s Task State Segment (TSS) and page table, TR and
CR3 can only be modiﬁed by code running at SPL 0. The
TSS of a process holds, among other things, the base phys-
ical address of the process’s page table. On a task switch,
the hardware automatically loads CR3 using the informa-
tion from TSS, and ﬂushes the TLB. Finally, a code segment
cannot lower its SPL without invoking a kernel service via
Interrupt gates.
1433.2 Control transfer among protection do-
mains
While the protection mechanisms described in the previous
subsection successfully conﬁne the instruction and data ac-
cesses of a code segmentto domainsat the same or less priv-
ileged levels, there are legitimate needs for less privileged
programs to access data or instructions at more privileged
levels. One of such mechanisms provided by Intel X86 ar-
chitecture is the call gate. A call gate is described by a 8-
byte segment descriptor entry in the GDT or LDT. To make
an inter-segment or inter-privilege-level procedure call, the
lcall instruction is used in conjunction with a call gate
ID. Each call gate entry also contains a descriptor privilege
Level that speciﬁes the minimum privilege level required to
accessthiscall gateandanentrypointto whichthecontrolis
ﬁrst transferredin everyinvocationof this call gate. Because
call gates themselves reside in the GDT/LDT, and thus are
modiﬁable only by code runningat SPL 0, normaluser-level
code cannot change them to gain unauthorized accesses.
To prevent corruption through stacks in inter-privilege-
level procedure calls, each privilege level has its own stack.
Stack switching is required for procedure calls that cross
privilege levels. Each process’s TSS has three stack point-
ers, one for SPL 0, 1, and 2, and each consists of a segment
selector and an offset. TSS does not keep a separate stack
pointer for SPL 3, because X86 architecture does not allow
a more privileged routine to call a less privileged routine.
Note that there is still a stack speciﬁcally for SPL 3, but SPL
3’s stack pointer does not have to be explicitly stored in the
TSS.
4 Intra-address space protection
4.1 Extension programming model
Palladiumsupportssafe anddynamicextensionsatbothuser
and kernel levels and assumes the following extension pro-
gramming model:
￿ A core program, the kernel or an extensible applica-
tion, is protected from dynamically-linked extension
modules but not vice versa. Among extension mod-
ules, the protection is only for safety but not for secu-
rity.
￿ Extensions are protected function calls, which are
single-threaded and always run to completion. The
extensions of all existing extensible operating systems
[23, 6, 15] are also based on this function call model.
￿ To avoid data copying, extensions and the core pro-
gram can share data through speciﬁc data areas that
could be chosen at run time.
￿ User extensions cannot make arbitrary system calls
withoutgoing throughhosting applications, and kernel
extensions can access only certain core kernel services
as determined by the kernel.
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Figure 2. The layout of a Linux process’s virtual ad-
dress space. The Procedure Linkage Table and Global
Offset Table used in dynamic loading/linking. Shared
libraries are memory mapped to the middle of the un-
used region between Heap and Stack. The shaded
areas are free regions.
4.2 Virtual address space structure in Linux
The currentprototype implementationof Palladium is based
on Linux 2.0.34. In Linux, the 4GByte virtual address space
(VAS) is arranged as follows. The User Code segmentspans
0 to 3GByte. The User Data/Stack segment also spans 0
to 3GByte. Both segments are accessible to user-level pro-
cesses and are set at SPL 3 and PPL 1. The Kernel Code and
Data/Stack segments both span 3GByte to 4GByte, and are
set at SPL 0 and thus protected from user processes. Ker-
nel segments are always present in the GDT and thus are
a part of every running user process, but they are only ac-
cessible through Interrupt gates. In summary, a Linux pro-
cess’s VAS has 4 segments: two user segments spanning
0 to 3GByte and two kernel segments spanning 3GByte to
4GByte. The protection of kernel segments from user seg-
ments are through both segment limit and SPL checks.
Figure 2 shows the layout of the virtual address space
of a Linux process. The user code is loaded at a starting
address a little bit greater than 0, thus leaving a hole at
the bottom. This hole is to map the code/data in ld.so
that performs relocation. Text is the code region, Data is
the initialized data region and BSS is the uninitialized data
region. Heap grows towards the Kernel segment whereas
Stack grows away from the Kernel segment. Global Offset
Table and Procedure Linkage Table are used to support dy-
namically linking/loading. The unused areas between Stack
and Heap are shown as shaded zones in Figure 2. Files can
bememorymappedintoanyfreeareainthe0-3GByterange.
For example, shared libraries are usually mapped into the
middle of the 0-3GByte range when they are loaded.
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4.3 Safe kernel extension mechanism based
on segment-level protection
Linux can load modules into the kernel dynamically using
the insmod utility. A loadable kernel module, once loaded,
is effectively part of the kernel in the sense that it can access
anything accessible to the kernel. The goal of Palladium’s
safe kernel extension mechanism is to prevent buggy kernel
extension modules from corrupting the kernel address space
and crashing the entire system. The basic idea of protecting
the kernel from its extension modules is simple: load each
extension module into a separate and less privileged seg-
ment that falls completely within the kernel address space,
as shown in Figure 3. Speciﬁcally, a special extension seg-
ment that spans a subrange of the kernel address space, i.e.,
between3GByte and4GByte, andhasitsSPL set at 1, is cre-
ated to hold extension modules. The kernel can still access
everything in the extension segment, but the extension mod-
ule is conﬁned to its own segment because any attempts to
access the portion of the kernel address space that is outside
the extension segment will cause either segment limit check
or SPL check to fail.
Figure 4 illustrates the interaction between a user pro-
cess, the kernel, and a kernel extension. A user process re-
quests a speciﬁc kernel service by calling an interrupt gate
(Step 1), which ﬁrst performs necessary checks, switches to
a per-process kernel stack and saves the code/stack pointers
for the user process, and jumps to the corresponding kernel
routine by indexing into the System Call Table (Step 2 and
3). After the kernel service is completed, the user process’s
state is restored and the control returns to the user process
(Step 10).
Palladiumloadsanuntrustedkernelextensionintoanex-
tension segment, including its code, data, and stack struc-
tures. Because the extension segment’s SPL is 1, it will
never be able to corrupt the part of the kernel address space
outside the extension segment. There is only one stack for
each extensionsegment; that stack is allocated when the ﬁrst
module is loaded into that extension segment. One or more
modules can be loaded into an extension segment. Mod-
ules loaded into the same extension segment can share a sin-
gle stack because Palladium assumes that they will not run
concurrently. Palladium does not provide protection among
software modules loaded into the same extension segment.
However, inter-module protection could be easily supported
by creating one extension segment per module. Modules
that share an extension segment can freely share data among
themselves without cross-segment data movement.
Whenever a new extension is loaded into the kernel, it
registers with the kernel one or multiple function pointers
as extension service entry points. The kernel keeps an Ex-
tension Function Table for these functions and invokes new
extension services as needed. Palladium ﬁrst checks for the
existence of a given extension by name (Step 4). If the re-
quired extensionservice has not yet been instantiated, no ac-
tion is taken; otherwise the correspondingservice is invoked
(Step 5 and 9).
Although extension modules are conﬁned to the exten-
sion segment, they may access kernel routines and states
throughapre-deﬁnedinterfacethatresemblesaconventional
user-kernel system-call interface (Step 6, 7, and 8), which in
thecurrentimplementationis designedspeciﬁcallyforapro-
grammable network router [22]. The kernel service function
calledby anextensionmoduleexecutesinthe kernelstackof
the user processthat triggersthe kernel extension. If the ker-
neldoesnotactonanyuserprocess’sbehalfwheninvokinga
kernelextension,suchkernelservicefunctionsexecuteinthe
stack oftheidle process. Theexecutionofa kernelextension
is expected to be entirely self-contained, i.e., without any
kernel service invocation. For example, packet ﬁlters, new
protocol stacks, and new device drivers have been shown to
be implementable in user space, where besides parameter
passing, interactionwith the kernelis onlyneededduringthe
initial set-up and ﬁnal result-passing phases, but not during
the execution of the main body of extensions. However, to
facilitate and simplify kernelextensionprogramming,Palla-
dium chooses to expose a set of core kernel services without
compromising safety/security.
Inadditionto synchronousfunctioncalls, Palladiumalso
supports a primitive form of asynchronous extensions. In
this case, the kernel puts a request into the target extension
module’srequestqueue,marksthemodulebusy, andreturns.
When extensions that are busy are scheduled for execution,
they pick up a request from their queue and run that request
to the completion before servicing the next. Asynchronous
extensions are used to support extension functions that are
not re-entrant but may be called independently from multi-
ple points in the kernel while the previous invocation is still
in progress. For example,an incomingpacket can be queued
for the asynchronous service of protocol-speciﬁc packet ﬁl-
tering, if the CPU is busy with other high-priority tasks on
packet arrival. Because each extension segment has its own
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Figure 4. Interactions between a user process, the kernel, and a kernel extension. A simple system call that does
not involve kernel extensions takes the path 1-2-3-10. A system call that requires the service of a self-contained
kernel extension takes the path 1-2-3-4-5-9-10. Finally, a system call that requires the service of a kernel extension,
which in turns requires some kernel service, takes the path 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10
stack, both synchronous and asynchronous extensions exe-
cute in the stack associated with their extension segments.
To facilitate data sharing and reduce data copying be-
tweenthekernelandextensionmodules,anextensioncanal-
locate ashareddataareainside its extensionsegment(shown
in Figure 4), to which the kernel can pass arguments into
and out of extension functions. The shared area is given a
well-known symbol, which the kernel checks for existence
at run time. This shared area is read/write accessible to both
the kernel and extension modules and is meant to hold non-
sensitive data during extension processing, e.g., the headers
of networkpacketsthat need to be examinedby boththe ker-
nel and its extensions.
Palladium’skernel extensionsare written as kernel mod-
ules and are loaded into the kernel using a modiﬁed version
of insmod. Extension programming is identical to kernel
module programming, except that they can build on the set
of core kernel services exposed to kernel extensions.
4.4 Safe user-level extensions
4.4.1 Combining paging and segmentation protection
A user-level process in Linux can also dynamically load an
extension module into its address space using dlopen,
dlsym and dlclose. Similar protection issues arise
between an extensible application, such as an extensi-
ble database management system, and its extension mod-
ules, such as type-speciﬁc access methods. Although the
segmentation-based kernel extension mechanism described
in the previous subsection could be applied to supporting
safe user-level extensions in theory, the following consider-
ations motivate us to develop a separate protection mecha-
nism for user-level extensions.
First, directlyapplyingthe segmentation-basedapproach
to user-level extensions makes it difﬁcult to share code or
data between an extensible application and its extensions.
Because the extended program and the extensions have dif-
ferent base addresses, pointers need to be swizzled before
being passed among segments. In a similar vein, the Linux
kernel interprets the pointer arguments passed through sys-
tem calls with respect to the base address 0. If extensions
are allowed to make system calls directly, the Linux kernel
has to identify the calling code segment’s base address and
adjusts the pointer arguments accordingly, for every system
call.
Secondly, the relocation routines in the current dynamic
library package need to be modiﬁed to load extensions to
an extension segment with a different base address than 0.
Because gcc and ld assume a linear virtual address space
architecture, they are not designed for segments.
Finally and most importantly, extensions cannot share
standard libraries with the extended program, because li-
brary routines such as libc are in the application segment
but outside any extension segment. Putting libc inside
an extension segment is not a solution to this problem be-
cause there may be multiple extension segments. Actually,
this scheme leads to a potential security vulnerability since
extensions may corrupt the extended application by damag-
ing the data areas used by libc functions that have internal
146buffers such as fprintf. Linking each extension module
statically with all the library functions it needs is another
possibility. Unfortunately, this approach not only wastes
memory, but is also incorrect, because a buffering and thus
statefullibraryfunctionmayhavemultiplecopiesresidingin
the same address space simultaneously. Note that the libc
problem does not exist in the context of kernel extensions.
Instead of pure segmentation, we chose an approachthat
uses both paging and segmentation protection hardware to
support safe user-level extensions, as shown in Figure 5.
An application process starts at SPL 3 by default and, if it
is meant to be extensible, it then promotes itself to SPL 2
through an init PL system call which sets the PPL of all
the process’s writable pages to 0 and creates an extension
segment that is at SPL 3 and spans 0 to 3GByte. Finally,
the PPL of any pages that the extended application wants to
expose to user-level extensions, such as code in shared li-
braries or data regions shared between the application and
extension, is set to 1. This data sharing mechanism dictates
that the size of the shared data area be a multiple of the page
size. It may also lead to additional data copying unless the
shared data is carefully placed when they are generated.
Because the applicationandextensionsegmentshavethe
same base address, a user-level extension can access any-
thing in the 0-3GByte address range at the segment level,
i.e., the segment-level protection checks will go through.
However, at the page level, an extension cannot access those
pages that the application chooses to hide and therefore are
at PPL 0, because the paging hardware prevents SPL 3 code
segments from accessing PPL 0 pages. Therefore, exten-
sionscan onlyaccess theirown code,data, and stack, as well
as shared libraries and data regions exposed by the extensi-
ble application. On the other hand, although the pages in the
kernel address space (3-4GByte) and the user address space
(0-3GByte) are all at PPL 0, the extensible application can-
not accessthe kerneladdressspace becauseof segment-level
protection. In summary, segment-level check ensures that
the kernel is protected from the extensible applications, and
page-level check protects the extensible applications from
their extensions, exactly the protection guarantees we are
looking for!
Because the extended application’s segment and the ex-
tension segments cover exactly the same virtual address
space range, all the problems associated with the segmen-
tation approach disappear. The relocation mechanism in
dlsymisdirectlyapplicablewithoutanymodiﬁcation. Data
and function pointers can be passed among the kernel, the
extended application, and extensions without swizzling. Ex-
tensions can call directly non-bufferinglibc routines such
as strcpy, because their pages are set at PPL 1. The data
areas of libc are at PPL 0. Therefore, extensions cannot
call bufferinglibraryroutinessuchas fprintfdirectly. In-
stead, Palladium allows applications to expose application
services to extensions, much as the kernel exposes core ker-
nel services to to kernel extensions as shown in Figure 4.
Only buffering library functions in libc are required to be
encapsulated as applications services, which extensions can
call but cannot corrupt. Unlike in the segmentation-only ap-
proach, extensions can call non-buffering library functions
without crossing protection domains.
User
Data/Stack
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PPL = 0
Segment
Code
User
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Figure 5. The layout of the user portion of a Palladium
process’s virtual address space. One or multiple exten-
sion segments, in this case 2, can be loaded into the
user address space (0-3GByte) and put at SPL 3, and
the pages therein are at PPL 1. The extended applica-
tion itself is at SPL 2, and its pages at PPL 0, except
those that are to be shared with extensions, which are
at PPL 1.
4.4.2 Programming interface
To use Palladium’s user-level extension mechanism, exten-
sible applications are required to use a safe version of the
dynamic loadingpackage, i.e.,seg dlopen, seg dlsym,
and seg dlclose, to load, access, and close shared li-
braries. However, seg dlsym should be used only for ac-
quiring function pointers. To resolve pointers to data struc-
turesinsideanextensionsegment,dlsymshouldbeusedin-
stead. In addition, the extensible application should call the
init PL function in the beginning of the program to pro-
mote itself to SPL 2 and mark all its writable pages as PPL
0. To expose shared pages to extensions, the application can
use the set range system call to mark those pages as PPL
1. Toexposeanapplicationservicethatuser-levelextensions
coulduse, the applicationuses the set call gate system
call to set up a call gate with a pointer to the corresponding
application service function.
Programming user-level extensions is identical to devel-
oping a user-level library routine, except that xmalloc in-
stead of malloc should be used to ensure that it’s the ex-
tension segment’s heap that is being allocated. Palladium’s
extensions are compiled with gcc, just like conventional
shared libraries. Calling an extension function from an ap-
plication and returning from a called extension back to the
calling application follow exactly the standard C syntax, al-
though applications and extensions reside at different privi-
lege levels.
147Each dynamically-linked function has a corresponding
Global Offset Table entry (GOT) and Procedure Linkage
Table (PLT) entry. When a dynamically linked function is
called, control ﬁrst goes to the corresponding PLT entry,
which containsa jmp instruction that jumpswhere the asso-
ciated GOTentrypoints. The ﬁrst time a dynamically-linked
function is invoked, its GOT entry points to the relocation
function in ld.so, which loads the function, performs nec-
essaryrelocation,andmodiﬁestheGOTentrytopointwhere
the function is actually loaded so that all subsequent invoca-
tionswouldtransfercontroldirectlytothefunction. Because
extensions need to access GOT to invoke shared libraries,
the GOT should be marked as PPL 1 and should be put in
a separate page to protect its neighboring regions, such as
BSS. Gcc uses an internal linker script to deﬁne the place-
ment of various sections of the program image, such as Text
and Data. Palladium requires applications to be compiled
with a speciﬁc gcc linker script that ensures that the GOT is
aligned on a page boundary. To protect the GOT from being
corrupted by extensions, Palladium marks the GOT page as
read-only by requiring that all modiﬁcations to the GOT be
made in the beginning of program execution. This means
that when the application and its extensions are loaded, the
symbols within them should be resolved eagerly, not lazily.
4.5 Implementation
4.5.1 Control transfer
Palladium has to solve two problems related to transferring
control between extended programs and their extensions.
First, the X86 architecture assumes that the control between
protection domains always starts from a less privileged level
to a more privileged level and back, as a standard system
call does. That is, a more privileged code segment can only
return to a less privileged code segment that called on its
service previously. A more privileged code segment cannot
directly call a less privileged code segment. However, Pal-
ladium’s extension model is meant for less privileged mod-
ules to extend the functionality of more privileged extended
programs (the kernel or extensible applications), so the con-
trol transfer is actually initiated by the more privileged core
programs. Second, gcc and ld have no knowledge of seg-
ments, anditis essential tokeepPalladiumcompletelytrans-
parent to gcc and ld to increase its applicability.
The solution to both problems is to add one level of
code indirection. Speciﬁcally, three code sequences are
added to hide the details of inter-domain control transfers
andthe call/returnsemanticsmismatchbetweenIntel’shard-
ware and Palladium’s requirements, as shown in Figure 6.
These code sequences basically perform inter-domain con-
trol transfer and stack pointers save/restore to twist X86’s
lret and lcall instructions to achieve the desired ef-
fects. To invoke an extension function, the application
ﬁrst makes a normal function call to an extension-function-
speciﬁc Prepare routine, running at SPL 2, which passes
the input argument to the extension stack, saves the appli-
cation’s stack and base pointers, constructs a phantom ac-
tivation record that corresponds to the target Transfer
function’s stack and code pointers, and ﬁnally executes a
lret. The phantom activation record is set up such that the
control would return to another extension-function-speciﬁc
Transferroutine,which is at SPL 3, as if this Transfer
routine called Prepare previously. The Transfer rou-
tine then simply makes a local function call to the target ex-
tension function to perform the extension service. When the
extensionfunctionis completed,itreturnsto theTransfer
routine, which makes an inter-domain call via a call gate to
an application-speciﬁc AppCallGate routine, which re-
stores the extensible application’s stack and base pointers,
and makes a local ret to transfer control back to the ex-
tended application.
In summary, a logical call from a more-privileged to a
less-privileged domain is implemented physically via two
intra-domain calls and an inter-domain lret instruction,
whereas a logical return from a less-privileged to a more-
privileged domain is implemented physically as two intra-
domain rets and an inter-domain lcall instruction. Note
that the Transfer and Prepare routines are speciﬁc to
each extension function, but AppCallGate is per applica-
tion. When seg dlsym is invoked to resolve a function
symbol, it generates the Transfer and Prepare rou-
tines, and returns a pointer to the corresponding Prepare
function, rather than to the original extension function. Be-
cause only function pointers in extension segments need to
be “massaged” when they are loaded, data pointers in exten-
sion segments can still be resolved by dlsym.
Saving and restoring the application’s base and stack
pointersin PrepareandAppCallGateismandatory,be-
cause Intel hardware automaticallyrestores the stack pointer
of the corresponding SPL from the process’s Task State
Segment after an lcall. However, because the correspond-
ing Prepare routine does not save the application stack
pointer to the TSS, the stack pointer that the hardware re-
stores after AppCallGate is called is not the calling ap-
plication’s stack. Consequently, explicit saving and restor-
ing is required. While Palladium could have chosen to save
the extended application’s stack pointers to the TSS so that
whatthe hardwarerestoreiscorrect,doingso wouldincuran
expensive system call overhead required to access the TSS,
and defeats the whole purpose of using segmentation hard-
ware for fast protected extension calls. Instead, Palladium
saves the stack/base pointers in the application segment, and
spends two additional instructions in AppCallGate to put
them back.
Palladium also allows applications to provide applica-
tion services to user extensions. The control transfer be-
tween user extensions and application services is similar to
control transfer in standard system call invocations, except
the following differences. Unlike system calls, which typ-
ically run in per-process kernel stacks, the application ser-
vice called by an extension executes against the extension
segment’s own stack rather than against the application seg-
ment’s stack. This design choice improves transparency be-
cause the standard parameter passing mechanism used by
gcc is directly applicable, including the support for func-
tions with variable numbers of arguments. In addition, no
cross-segment data copying is required. The current Palla-
dium implementation assumes that extensions take one 4-
byte input argument, which is passed through the stack, and
148   pushl  0x4(%esp)
   popl  ExtensionStack
   movl  %esp, SP2
   movl  %ebp, BP2
   push  ExtensionStackSegment
   pushl  ExtensionStackPointer
   push  ExtensionCodeSegment
   push  Transfer
   lret
Prepare: 
   mov SP2, %esp
   mov BP2, %ebp
   ret
AppCallGate:
   call  ExtensionFunction
   lcall  AppCallGateNum
 
Transfer:
(SPL = 3)
Segment
(SPL = 2)
Segment
Extension
Application
local
call
return
inter-domain
call
return
local
call
local
return
inter-domain
local
Application
Extension  Function
Figure 6. Calling an extension goes through Prepare and Transfer, whereas the return path goes through
Transfer and AppCallGate. Prepare’s ﬁrst two instructions copy the extension call’s input argument to the
extension’s stack. The next four instructions save the stack and base pointers of the application segment so that
later on AppCallGatecan restore them. Finally the four instructions above lret synthesizes an artiﬁcial activation
record in the extension stack for lret.
return one 4-byte result, which is passed through the regis-
ter ﬁle. More complicated data structures are stored in the
shared data area, and input and result argumentsare pointers
to them.
4.5.2 Other kernel modiﬁcations
In addition to the new system calls described above, Palla-
dium also requires several kernel modiﬁcations. First, to en-
sure that an extensible application process’s writable pages
are always marked as PPL 0, mmap is modiﬁed to mark all
the pages in a memory region to be mapped as PPL 0 if the
memory region is writable and the process that invokes the
mmap is at SPL 2. The actual marking is performed at the
page fault time. Similarly, mprotect is changed to pre-
vent an SPL 3 extension from tampering with the PPL of a
memory segment at SPL 2.
In Palladium, the standard page fault handler needs to
check whether an extension attempts to access the extended
application’s memory that is outside the extension segment.
This check is based on the application’s SPL, the SPL of the
code segment of the routine that causes the page fault, and
the page’s PPL and permission bits. If this check fails, a
SIGSEGV fault is delivered to the corresponding user pro-
cess.
The segment/pageprivilege levels of a processare inher-
ited across fork calls along with the entire memory map.
This allows an extensible application that is already at SPL
2 to fork a copy of itself. The forked clone continues to ex-
ecute at SPL 2 and inherit all the loaded extensions. On the
other hand, the segment/page privilege levels of a process
are not inherited across exec calls, because new processes
by default should start at SPL 3 and only move to SPL 2
when they plan to load untrusted extensions.
To prevent extension routines at SPL 3 from making
arbitrary system calls, Palladium ﬁrst adds a new ﬁeld,
taskSPL, to each process’s task struct as its logical
SPL. When a process starts up, its taskSPL is 3 until it
promotes itself through init PL, at which point taskPL
is 2. Whenever the kernel receives a system call, the ker-
nel rejects the call if calling process’s taskPL is 2 and the
return code segment’s SPL is 3. Note that for those applica-
tions that do not call init PL at start-up, the above check
would fail because these applications’ taskPL is 3. There-
fore, non-Palladiumapplications still can make system calls
asusual. We chosetorunnon-Palladiumapplicationsat SPL
3,asinstandardLinux,toavoiddisruptionstothelargenum-
ber of existing Linux applications. Palladium applications
can allow their user extensions to make a selective subset of
system calls by encapsulating them as application services.
To prevent “inﬁnite loop” bugs in extension routines,
Palladium sets a time limit on the maximal amount of CPU
time that a user/kernel extension module can get in each in-
vocation. This limit is a system parameter set by the sys-
tem administrator and is enforced through explicit checks at
timer interrupts. When the timer expires or when a protec-
tion error is detected, the kernel aborts the offending kernel
extension and, in the case of user extensions, sends a sig-
nal to the extensible application, which is supposed to have
a signal handler to deal with such errors. The current Pal-
149Component Inter Intra Hardware
Setting up stack 26 2 5
Calling function 34 3 22
Returning to caller 75 3 44
Restoring state 7 2 5
Total Cost 142 10 89
Table 1. Comparison between the invocation costs for
function calls within the same protection domain (In-
tra), across protection domains, with (Inter) and without
software overhead (Hardware). All measurements are
in terms of numbers of CPU cycles from the Pentium
counter.
ladium prototype does not perform any clean-up for aborted
kernel extensions, beyond reclaiming the system resources
previously allocated to these extensions.
5 Performance evaluation
We have built two applications on the Palladium prototype,
one based on the user-level extension mechanism, and the
other based on the kernel extension mechanism, to eval-
uate Palladium’s performance at the application level. In
this section, we report the performance results from micro-
benchmark and applications measurements.
5.1 Micro-benchmarking results
Because Palladium’s protection mechanism is based on
hardware checks, its performance overhead consists of the
cost of invoking an extension function and the one-time ex-
tensionmoduleloadingtime. Tomeasuretheprotectedfunc-
tion call overhead, we wrote a null function with an empty
body and compiled it with gcc 2.7.2.3 into a shared li-
brary. The code generated for this function contains only
the function prologueand epilogue code. Using the Pentium
counter, we measured the number of CPU cycle required to
invoke this null function call using Palladium’s user-level
extension mechanism on a Pentium 200MHz machine. The
results are shown in Table 1.
The number of CPU cycles required for a protected or
inter-domain procedure call in Palladium is 142, or 0.71
￿sec for a 200MHz machine. The Setting up stack row is
the time requiredto create a faked activationrecord and save
registers. The Calling function row showsthe time required
to do the actual control transfer to the extension function.
This step involves a lret and a call instruction in Palla-
dium.T h eReturn to caller row is the time needed to return
control to the caller. This is essentially an lcall instruc-
tion in Palladium.T h eRestoring state row shows the time
to restore the application to the state before it calls the ex-
tension. For unprotected function calls, this corresponds to
popping registers off the stack. For Palladium, this involves
popping registers and executing an additional ret instruc-
tion. Over half of Palladium’s inter-domain procedure call
overhead is due to the time taken to return control to the
application from an extension because switching the privi-
lege level from SPL 3 to SPL 2 requires additional checks.
Size of string Unprotected Palladium Linux
(Bytes) call call RPC
32 2.20 2.79 349.19
64 4.06 4.65 352.55
128 7.78 8.37 374.20
256 15.22 15.97 423.33
Table 2. Comparison between unprotected function
call, protected extension function call, and Linux RPC.
All measurements are in microseconds. Each data
point is an average of the results from 100 runs, with
a standard deviation of less than 2% of the mean in all
cases.
This one instruction, lcall, takes about 75 cycles. Table
1 also shows the theoretical cycle counts required for the in-
struction sequences used in Palladium’s control transfer, ac-
cording to the Pentium architecture manual. The difference
between the measuredand theoretical cycle countsis mainly
due to data/control pipeline hazards.
To the best of our knowledge,the fastest IPC mechanism
on Pentium machines is reported on L4 micro-kernel [16].
L4 takes 242 cycles on a Pentium 166MHz machine for an
request-replyIPC in the best case. This cycle countassumes
that all the parameters can be passed via registers. In L4,
processes share page tables as much as possible. Hence an
IPC does not require a page table switch. Still, a request-
reply IPC in L4 involves four protection-domain crossings,
whereas Palladiumtakes only two. As a result, Palladiumas
measured on the Linux kernel is faster than the best case of
L4 by 100 cycles.
To evaluate Palladium’s performance in a more realistic
context, we wrote an artiﬁcial extension function that ac-
cepts a pointer to a string and reverses the string. We com-
piled this function as an extension shared library, as an un-
protected function call within the address space, and as a
client-server program with client and server running on the
same machine using Linux’s Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
facility, which is socket-basedand is not optimized for intra-
machine RPC. We then measured the time it takes from call-
ing such a function until control is returned to the calling
program, with the size of the string varied from 32 to 256
bytes in powers of two. The results are shown in Table 2 and
expressed in microseconds. Each data point in the table is
an average of the results of 100 runs, with a standard devi-
ation of less than 2% of the mean in all cases. During the
experiments, the CPU cache is fully warmed up.
The Linux-RPC version is more than two orders of mag-
nitude slower than the protected and unprotected function
call versions when the input size is 32 bytes. When the data
size increases to 256 bytes, the RPC version is still about
14 times slower than the protected and unprotected function
call versions. This shows that the constant overhead associ-
ated with IPC is quite signiﬁcant. The performance differ-
encebetweenaunprotectedprocedurecallandaPalladium’s
protected remains largely constant, about 118 cycles for the
string size between 32 bytes and 128 bytes. The difference
increases to 153 cycleswhen the string size is 256 bytes. We
believe this discrepancy is due to factors unrelated to Palla-
dium, because some of the 256-byte runs do show a differ-
150ence of 118 cycles. Because the total processing time of this
extension increases with the data size, the constant exten-
sion invocation overhead becomes less and less signiﬁcant
in relative terms.
Palladium incurs a slightly higher overhead when load-
ing an extension module: dlopen and seg dlopen take
400
￿sec and420
￿sec, respectively. Theadditionalstepthat
seg dlopen performs compared to dlopen is setting the
PPL of those pages that the extended application exposes to
1. PPL marking has a start-up cost of 3000 to 5000 cycles,
plus 45 cycles per page marked. That is, marking 10 pages
takes 3450 to 5450 cycles, or 17.25 to 27.25
￿sec, which is
completely overshadowed by the dynamic library open cost.
Because Palladium allocates separate segments for ker-
nel extensions, cross-segment memory references incur an
additional overhead for loading the segment register, which
is 2 to 3 cycles according to Intel’s architecture manual, but
is consistently 12 cycles from our own measurement. Since
Palladiumsupportsshared data areasbetweenthe kerneland
kernelextensions, we expectthe frequencyof cross-segment
data references in typical kernel extensions to be low. Note
that cross-segment references are not necessary in the case
of user-level extensions, because extended applications and
their extension segments span the same address space range.
5.2 Measurements from extensible applica-
tions
We have built on top of the Apache Web server a fast Com-
mon Gateway Interface (CGI) invocation mechanism called
LibCGI [28], which allows a CGI script written in C to be
invoked as a function call rather than as a separate process
as in standard CGI implementation. FastCGI [9] attempts to
reduce the invocation overhead of CGI scripts by re-using
existing CGI processes, thus eliminating the costs associ-
ated with fork and exec. Palladium’suser-level extension
mechanism provides the necessary protection for the Web
server from LibCGI scripts.
We measured the number of CGI requests that a Web
server can support per second from a conventional CGI
script, a FastCGI script, a LibCGI script, a protectedLibCGI
script using Palladium, and a static HTML ﬁle. Fetching
a static HTML ﬁle does not involve the CGI, and thus its
performance serves as the best-case reference point. Perfor-
mance measurements on ApacheBench benchmark [2] were
takenfroma modiﬁedApacheWeb Serverrunningona Pen-
tium 200MHz machine with 64 MBytes of SDRAM and 2
GBytes of Disk Space. In each run, a total of 1000 requests
were sent to the Web server with up to 30 requests being
serviced concurrently. The Web server and its clients are
connected via a 100 Mbps Fast Ethernet link, which is qui-
escent in all runs. Each request involves an access to a ﬁxed
HTML ﬁle that ismemory-resident. The Web servercan ser-
vice each request directly by opening the static HTML ﬁle,
reading it into memory, and writing it back to the requesting
client, orby invokinga CGI scriptthatdoesexactlythe same
thing using different CGI execution models.
Table 3 shows the throughputswhen the requests are ser-
viced by the Web Server directly and by CGI scripts under
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Figure 7. Performance comparison of a compiled ﬁl-
ter extension and the interpreted BPF ﬁlter for a ﬁlter
with a varying number of terms linked by a conjunc-
tion, when all terms are true. The measurements are
in CPU cycles.
different execution models. The Web Server column estab-
lishes a bound on the CGI script execution throughput,since
there is no CGI script invocation overhead in this case. For
all data sizes, unprotectedLibCGI and protectedLibCGI are
within 3% and 5% of the bound, respectively. This shows
thatLibCGI iseffectiveinreducingthe overheadofinvoking
CGI scripts. On the other hand, protected LibCGI is at least
twice as fast as FastCGI fordatasize smaller than10KBytes.
A moreinterestingcomparisonis that betweenprotectedand
unprotected LibCGI. The throughputof protected LibCGI is
about 97.5% of that of unprotected LibCGI when the data
size is 28 bytes. In all cases, protected LibCGI performs
within 4% of unprotected LibCGI. This performance result
demonstrates that the additional overhead that Palladium in-
curs is minimal.
When a user-level extension attempts to access pages
outside its domain, such an access generates a page fault,
and a SIGSEGV signal is delivered to the extended applica-
tion. Thelatencyfromdetectingan offendingaccessto com-
pleting the deliveryof the associated SIGSEGV signal to the
applicationtakes 3,325cycles onthe averagewith a standard
deviation of 0.3%. In the case of kernel extensions, an of-
fending access would cause a general protection exception,
because the extension is attempting to access data beyond
its segment limit. The average cost of processing such an
exception is 1,020 cycles (0.5% standard deviation), exclud-
ing the extension-speciﬁc overhead associated with systems
resource de-allocation. While these costs are relatively high,
they are present only for misbehaving extensions and thus
would not affect the critical path delay in the common case.
To evaluate the effectiveness of Palladium’s safe kernel
extension mechanism, we built a compiled packet ﬁlter [22]
that allows a ﬁltering program written in C to be loaded into
the kernel as an extension, and we measured the time to exe-
cute a packet ﬁlter rule consisting of a conjunction of multi-
ple terms. We comparedthese measurementsto the timesre-
quired by the standard bpf ﬁlter function used in TCPdump.
The BPF ﬁlter essentially compiles the ﬁlter expression into
151Throughput(requests/sec)
Size of HTML CGI FastCGI LibCGI LibCGI Web
ﬁle requested (Protected) (Unprotected) Server
28 Bytes 98 193 437 448 460
1K B y t e s 92 188 423 431 436
10 KBytes 76 130 311 312 315
100 KBytes 33 52 57 57 57
Table 3. Comparison of CGI, FastCGI and LibCGI in their execution throughput as measured by numbers of scripts
completed per second. The client and server are connected with a 100 Mbps Ethernet link.
its own machine language and interprets the resulting ex-
pressions to evaluate the conditions. The performance com-
parisons are shown in Figure 7. Beyond a ﬁxed invocation
overhead,theperformanceoverheadofthekernel-extension-
based packet ﬁlter increases with a very small slope, staying
almost constant. On the other hand, BPF’s interpretation
overhead increases signiﬁcantly with the number of terms
in the test packet ﬁlter rule. When the number of terms
in the ﬁlter rule is 4, the extension-based packet ﬁlter is
more than twice as fast as the interpreter-based packet ﬁl-
ter. These measurements demonstrate the efﬁciency of Pal-
ladium’s kernel extension mechanism.
6 Conclusion
This paper describes the design, implementation, and eval-
uation of of an intra-address space protection mechanism
called Palladium, which is based on the paging and segmen-
tation protection hardware available in Intel X86 architec-
ture. Palladium proves that safe and efﬁcient user-level and
kernel-level extensions that could be programmed in a sim-
ilar way to standard library functions are feasible. In ad-
dition, Palladium’s protection domain switching overhead
is the smallest among all known methods. Finally, to the
best of our knowledge, Palladium is the ﬁrst system that has
successfully exploited the segmentation feature in Intel pro-
cessors in a useful way. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of Palladium, we have built a fast and safe CGI invocation
mechanism that allows CGI routines to be invoked from a
Web server as local function calls, and an efﬁcient packet
ﬁlter that allows packet ﬁltering programs to run on native
hardware safely inside the kernel.
We are currently pursuing several directions based on
the Palladium prototype. First, we are planning to build a
mobile code system based on Palladium. Combined with
restricted OS services, Palladium could provide the secu-
rity guarantee for mobile applets that are written in a com-
piled language such as C. Although binary portability poses
a problem for this approach, the fact that a vast majority of
desktop computers are Intel-based PC’s renders this prob-
lem less an issue in practice. Second, we are leveraging our
experiences in exploiting segmentation hardware for other
purposes. For example, we are building a protected mem-
ory service that uses segmentation to prevent wild pointers
or random software errors from corrupting speciﬁc physical
memory regions. Third, better programmingtools for exten-
sions programming are needed, in particular, segmentation-
aware debuggers and stub code generators to synthesize ap-
plication or kernel services for extensions. Finally, we are
building more extensible applications, especially in the ar-
eas of database systems and 3D graphics software, to gain
more usage and performance experiences on Palladium.
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